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 Capturing industrial CO2 emissions in Spain:  
Infrastructures, costs and break-even prices 
 
Olivier MASSOL a,b,c,d* Stéphane TCHUNG-MING  Albert BANAL-ESTAÑOL c,e
Abstract 
This paper examines the conditions for the deployment of large-scale pipeline and storage 
infrastructure needed for the capture of CO2 in Spain by 2040. It details a modeling 
framework that allows us to determine the optimal infrastructure needed to connect a 
geographically disaggregated set of emitting and storage clusters, along with the threshold 
CO2 values necessary to ensure that the considered emitters will make the necessary 
investment decisions. This framework is used to assess the relevance of various policy 
scenarios, including (i) the perimeter of the targeted emitters for a CCS uptake, and (ii) the 
relevance of constructing several regional networks instead of a single grid to account for 
the spatial characteristics of the Spanish peninsula. We find that three networks naturally 
emerge in the north, center and south of Spain. Moreover, the necessary CO2 break-even 
price critically depends on the presence of power stations in the capture perimeter. Policy 
implications of these findings concern the elaboration of relevant, pragmatic 
recommendations to envisage CCS deployment locally, focusing on emitters with lower 
substitution options toward low-carbon alternatives.  
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1. Introduction 
Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS)1 is recurrently presented as a critically needed technology in 
long-term energy scenarios (e.g., IEA, 2017; Knopf et al., 2013)2 because it de facto reconciles the 
existing dependence upon fossil fuels while making achievable the ambitious CO2 abatement targets 
required for a 2°C-compatible world. However, CCS faces the reality of a slower-than-anticipated 
uptake. With few exceptions, to date, large-scale integrated CCS projects have not been commercially 
deployed, and skepticism regarding the future outlook of that technology (Banks and Boersma, 2015) is 
now increasing. In light of these difficulties, research examining the socio-economic barriers to the 
deployment of CCS and proposing adapted policy remedies is now gaining momentum.3 
For policymakers, a crucial question mark remains to be addressed and provides the basic 
motivation for the present paper: what is the market price per ton of CO2 that would be needed to 
trigger the adoption of CCS capabilities? To address it, our point of departure is the policy discussion in 
Herzog (2011) who called for further attention to be paid to the conditions needed for the construction 
of a large-scale CO2 pipeline and storage infrastructure to be decided. So far, CO2 infrastructure issues 
have predominantly been examined through the application of optimization techniques to identify the 
cost-minimizing design of an integrated CCS infrastructure network (Bakken and von Streng Velken, 
2008; Middleton and Bielicki, 2009; Kemp and Kasim, 2010; Klokk et al., 2010; Mendelevitch et al., 
2010; Kuby et al., 2011; Morbee et al., 2012; Oei et al., 2014; Oei and Mendelevitch, 2016). Yet, an 
examination of these prior contributions suggests two possible policy-relevant extensions.  
                                                 
1
 CCS is the integrated process of capturing CO2 at large, stationary sources (e.g., thermal power plants, industrial sites) and 
storing it permanently in a suitable geological formation to prevent its release into the atmosphere. 
2
 For example: in its latest Energy Technology Perspectives outlook (IEA, 2017), the International Energy Agency presents a 
2°C scenario for which the contribution of CCS accounts for 14% (3rd position behind energy efficiency and renewable energy 
sources) of the additional abatements with respect to a reference scenario. 
3
 In response to that situation, a rapidly burgeoning literature has recently investigated, among other topics: (i) the social 
acceptability and the public attitudes with respect to CCS infrastructures (Shackley et al., 2004; Riesch et al., 2013; Gough et 
al., 2014; Braun et al., 2017); (ii) the adapted R&D policies for the CCS technology (Eckhause, 2011; Eckhause and Herold, 
2014); (iii) the design of the fiscal and regulatory incentives needed to foster the rapid and massive adoption of carbon 
capture capabilities (Comello and Reichelstein, 2014; Banal-Estañol et al., 2016). 
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First, in most of these articles, the bulk of the emissions transported and stored is supplied by the 
power sector which is assumed to play a central role in the analysis. However, Hirschhausen et al. 
(2012) and Martinez Arranz (2015) question the usefulness of the deployment of carbon capture 
capabilities at thermal generation plants as alternative technologies (e.g., the installation of renewable 
energy sources) are likely to provide more affordable mitigation options. In contrast, CCS is critically 
needed to decarbonize other carbon-intensive industries for which there are no other abatement 
technologies (e.g., cement, iron and steel). As the future prospects for CCS in the power sector are 
jeopardized, there is a need to examine the economics of a less ambitious CCS deployment that would 
overlook the power sector and concentrate solely on the other industrial sectors. At first sight, one may 
infer that the absence of the power sector is likely to make the emergence of CCS even more complex 
as there will be a smaller volume of CO2 over which to spread the large fixed costs of the pipeline 
infrastructure. That said, the exact nature of that effect and its magnitude still have to be documented.  
Second, one can remark that the models used in these earlier contributions implicitly posit an 
idealized industrial organization whereby a unique decision-maker (e.g., a benevolent central planner) is 
assumed to have total control over the whole CCS chain. However, in reality, the creation of a large-
scale CCS infrastructure with national scope is subject to the individual decisions to adopt carbon 
capture capabilities taken by a group of independent emitters. As these emitters are unlikely to strictly 
obey a “superior” decision-maker, a closer examination of the coordination issues faced by that 
collection of independent agents is needed. In a recent contribution, Massol et al. (2015) develop a 
cooperative game theoretic approach to investigate the conditions needed for a collection of emitters to 
share a common pipeline infrastructure and to determine the break-even price for CCS adoption. Yet, 
that prior analysis concentrates only on the simplistic case of a point-to-point pipeline system that 
connects the emitters in Le Havre to a unique storage site located near Rotterdam and posits that 
emitters have an unique outside option: laying an alternative pipeline along that route. However, in 
reality, one can envision the deployment of a meshed network infrastructure that has a more flexible 
morphology and on which one can hardly pair each emitter with a storage location.  
4 
The purpose of this paper is thus to examine the conditions for the deployment of a large-scale 
CO2 infrastructure project aimed at transporting the CO2 emissions captured at a series of industrial 
clusters to a series of storage sites where the CO2 could be injected into a saline aquifer for permanent 
storage. To account for the difficulty in organizing the adoption of carbon capture capabilities in the 
energy sector, our analysis successively considers two scenarios that depend on whether the CO2 
emissions from carbon intensive industrial facilities (iron and steel, cement, pulp and paper) are 
supplemented or not by the volumes of CO2 captured at thermal generation plants and oil refineries.  
We consider Spain as a case study for our analysis because at least three distinct lines of 
arguments make it an interesting candidate. First, fossil fuels represent 85% of the Spanish primary 
energy supply, while the 240Mt of CO2 emitted account for 7.5% of the EU28 total. As a member of the 
EU, Spain is fully committed to reaching the European objectives of reducing emissions by 40% in 
2030 and 85% in 2050 with respect to the 1990 levels. Second, spatial considerations cannot be 
overlooked. While the North Sea oil fields are recurrently presented as a preferred destination for the 
CO2 captured in Europe, the cost of routing the CO2 captured in Spain to the trunkline systems 
envisioned in northern Europe would be prohibitive.4 Third, a remarkable data set on emission sources 
and storage potentials has recently been assembled for that country under the auspices of COMET, a 
large project funded by the EU (Boavida et al., 2011, 2013; Kanudia et al., 2013).  
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the Spanish case. Section 3 describes the 
determination of the least-costly CCS infrastructure and identifies three regional subsystems that could 
be independently deployed in Spain. Section 4 has a methodological nature and explains how the 
conditions for CCS adoption can be identified using cooperative game-theoretic notions. Section 5 
discusses our assumptions regarding the cost of the carbon capture operations conducted at each cluster. 
Section 6 presents our results regarding the break-even prices for the deployment of the three regional 
subsystems and compares them with the values derived from traditional cost-engineering studies that do 
                                                 
4
 Oei et al. (2014) formulate an infrastructure planning model aimed at determining the least costly deployment of a European 
CCS infrastructure. According to their simulation results (see Oei et al., 2014 – figures 5 to 8), nations like Spain and 
Portugal should favor the deployment of an Iberian-centric CCS infrastructure that would remain physically disconnected 
from the northern European CO2 pipeline systems. 
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not take into account the existence of strategic interactions among players connected to a common 
infrastructure. The last section summarizes our conclusions and highlights the policy implications of 
our analysis. The detailed numerical assumptions retained for our analysis are presented in Appendix A. 
Appendix B presents the detailed specification of the optimization model used to support our analysis. 
2. Background: The Spanish sources of CO2 and potential sinks 
In this section, we first describe the situation of CCS in Spain, in terms of the spatial distribution 
of emission clusters and storage sites, and the techno-economic characteristics of transport and storage 
technologies.  
2.1 The emission clusters under scrutiny 
According to the European Pollutant Release and Transfer Register (E-PRTR) database,5 a total of 
144 large facilities are currently emitting CO2 in mainland Spain6 in 2014. This number is too large to 
follow the approach in Massol et al. (2015) that examines the plants’ individual decisions to adopt 
carbon capture capabilities.7 
Instead, we build upon the approach retained in the EU-funded COMET project and follow 
Boavida et al. (2011, 2013) who grouped emitters into clusters of reasonable size (see Appendix A). 
Our analysis thus considers 16 distinct clusters labeled E1 to E16 (see Table 1).8 The map in Figure 1 
illustrates their locations. It should be noted that, with the exception of the Madrid area, these clusters 
are predominantly located in the coastal regions and their hinterlands, which is consistent with the 
spatial distributions of the country’s population and heavy industries.  
Table 1. The emission clusters 
[PLEASE_INSERT_TABLE_1_HERE]  
                                                 
5
 See: http://prtr.ec.europa.eu/  
6
 i.e.: Ceuta, Melilla, the Balearic and Canary Islands excluded. 
7
 It would require an evaluation of the cost of installing an optimal CCS infrastructure for each of 2144≈ 2.23×1043 coalitions 
that can be formed by these 144 emitters, which is computationally out of reach.  
8
 The correspondence between our clusters and the ones used in the COMET project is detailed in Appendix A. 
6 
Figure 1. The geography of the emission clusters and the candidate pipelines and storage sites 
[PLEASE_INSERT_FIGURE_1_HERE]  
We consider the construction of a CCS infrastructure that is aimed at being operated during a 30-
year planning horizon starting in 2040. This starting date is consistent with both the IEA’s future global 
outlook for CCS which posits that the technology will be commercially available on that date (IEA, 
2016); and the simulation results of the TIMES model developed under the COMET project that show 
that a mature CCS infrastructure will need to be installed in Spain on that date (Kanudia et al., 2013).  
We investigate the possible future deployment of a CCS infrastructure in Spain through two 
scenarios. The first one is labeled “All” and posits that all the CO2 that can be captured by the thermal 
power stations, the cement factories, the oil refineries, the pulp and paper plants, and the iron and steel 
industries at each of the 16 emission nodes will be captured. The second is labeled “Indus_only” and 
considers only the emissions from the cement factories, the pulp and paper plants, and the iron and steel 
industries at clusters where these industries collectively emit at least 1 MtCO2/year.  
Our motivations for considering the restricted scenario “Indus_only” that omits both the thermal 
generation plants and the oil refineries are threefold. Firstly, this scenario is consistent with the Spanish 
coal situation. In recent years, the government has begun to emphasize the need to organize an 
industrial reconversion of the mining areas, aiming for a gradual closure of the coal mines (Zafrilla, 
2014).9 As the Spanish coal mining industry is gradually disappearing, one wonders whether there will 
be a possible decline of coal-based power generation in the country. Secondly, the relevance of carbon 
capture technologies in the power sector is now being questioned because, in contrast to CCS, 
investment costs for renewables have experienced substantial cost decreases through higher learning 
effects which have made them a much cheaper abatement option (Hirschhausen et al., 2012; Martinez 
Arranz, 2015). In contrast, avoiding CO2 emissions in the industrial sectors may be more important than 
in the electricity sector, because in some industries (e.g., cement, iron and steel) low-carbon substitute 
                                                 
9
 This is a notable change because, historically, via subsidies Spain facilitated the use of domestic coal in power plants to 
compensate its lack of competitiveness (as opposed to imports from other countries) and thereby protect employment in the 
Spanish mining regions (Rosal Fernández, 2000). 
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technologies are more difficult to develop than in the electricity sector, and avoidance costs through the 
potential use of CCS may also be cheaper. Lastly, our decision to omit the refining sector is justified by 
the very high cost of equipping these industrial sites with carbon capture capabilities. An oil refinery 
represents a complex collection of carbon-emitting processing units that all have to be equipped with 
dedicated carbon capture equipment (Leeson et al., 2017). Compared to simpler industries like iron and 
steel or cement where the bulk of the CO2 emissions generally come from one or two sources, the 
presence of a much larger number of small emission sources is reputed to make the implementation of 
carbon capture more technically challenging and expensive. 
The “Indus_only” scenario thus echoes these recommendations to (i) abandon the aspiration of a 
broader deployment of CCS encompassing both the industrial activities and the energy industries, and 
(ii) follow a selective deployment aimed at “picking the low hanging fruit.” This would be achieved by 
focusing solely on the heavy industries where carbon capture is both affordable, hardly substitutable, 
and the least costly mitigation option. 
Our assumptions regarding the annual quantities of CO2 that can be captured under the two 
scenarios are based on the simulation results of the TIMES model developed by Kanudia et al. (2013) 
for the COMET project10 and were constructed as follows. We examine the simulation results of that 
model for the year 2040 in a mitigation scenario whereby the evolution of the EU energy system is 
obliged to achieve the EU-2020 targets as well as a 40% reduction of the domestic greenhouse gas 
emissions by 2050 relative to 1990.11 These simulation results provide for each emission cluster the 
annual quantity of CO2 that will be emitted by the electricity, pulp and paper, cement, refining, and iron 
and steel plants, respectively. Only a fraction of these emissions can be captured via CCS. In this study, 
                                                 
10
 We are grateful to Dr. Amit Kanudia (KanORS) for having kindly shared with us the detailed results of the numerous 
simulations he conducted for the COMET project. 
11
 Oei and Mendelevitch (2016) retained a similar mitigation scenario for their analysis of the deployment of CCS. We have 
also considered a -80% scenario as this target provides the base working assumption used by the European Commission for 
decarbonizing the European economy. Yet, a detailed examination of the potential for CCS deployment obtained under the  
-40% and -80% scenarios in the simulation results prepared for the COMET project shows that, though the timing of the 
deployment differ under the two scenarios, the annual quantities of CO2 captured after 2040 are similar. As we conduct a 
static analysis here for 2040 when the demands for CO2 storage are similar under these two scenarios, we consider that 
focusing on the -40% scenarios is a reasonable assumption for this work. 
8 
we use the sector-specific capture rates mentioned in Kanudia et al. (2013): 90% in the electricity and 
pulp and paper sectors, 85% in the cement and refining sectors, and 65% in the iron and steel sectors.12 
As we did not have access to the annual emissions trajectories after the year 2040, we assume that the 
emission data will remain steady over time.  
The annual quantities ijQ  of CO2 captured by the plants in each industrial sector j  in each cluster 
i  are detailed in Figure 2 where the color blue (respectively: red, green) is used for the thermal power 
plants (respectively: the oil refineries, the other industries). 
Figure 2. The capture potentials ijQ  at each cluster under each scenario (in MtCO2/year) 
[PLEASE_INSERT_FIGURE_2_HERE] 
Under the optimistic scenario “All,” the total annual quantity that can be captured at these 16 
clusters attains 112.7 MtCO2/year which, according to the results of the TIMES-COMET model, 
represents about 60% of the nation’s annual CO2 emissions at stationary sources in 2040. The power 
sector (respectively, the refining sector) accounts for 39.7% (respectively, 8.9%) of that capture 
potential. Hence, it is interesting to highlight: (i) the important weight of the three other industrial 
sectors which together account for more than half of the total capture potential (58.0 MtCO2/year), and 
(ii) among them, the large size of the cement sector that represents more than a third of the total capture 
potential (38.1 MtCO2/year). From a spatial perspective, one can remark that the distribution of the 
clusters’ capture potentials is not uniform. An average cluster would have a capture potential of 7.0 
MtCO2/year but the two largest clusters (namely E2 – the cement plants and heavy industries in 
Asturias – and E7 the metropolitan area of Barcelona) together account for 24% of the overall capture 
potential whereas the two smallest clusters (namely E4 near Burgos and E16 near Santander) only 
capture 2.5% of that total.13  
                                                 
12
 Overall, one can observe that the capture rates posited in our study are consistent with the rates mentioned in a recent 
review of the techno-economic literature on carbon capture authored by a team of researchers and CCS experts at Imperial 
College (Leeson et al., 2017). 
13
 One could thus wonder whether the two smallest clusters, E4 and E16, should be connected to a CCS infrastructure. In this 
paper, we have decided to keep them in our list because of their convenient location: both are located along the natural 
9 
Under the restricted scenario “Indus_only,” only 12 clusters have a capture potential larger than 
our 1 MtCO2/year threshold. Accordingly, there is no need to consider the emission clusters located in 
Tarragona (E8), Cartagena (E11), Algeciras (E13), and Santander (E16) in that scenario. The cumulated 
capture potential of the industrial sites located at the 12 remaining clusters attains 55.2 MtCO2/year, 
which represents 62.4% of the annual volume of CO2 emitted by the Spanish pulp and paper, cement, 
and iron and steel sectors in 2040. The average quantity of CO2 that can be captured at one of these 12 
clusters is 4.9 MtCO2/year but, again, the large integrated steel mill located in Asturias (E2) and the 
cement factories located near Barcelona (E7) and Madrid (E15) have a significantly larger capture 
potential. 
2.2 Storage sites 
Spain has a favorable geologic endowment in onshore saline aquifers. In a recent geoscience 
study, Carneiro et al. (2015) examine the techno-economic characteristics (i.e., volume, injection 
capacities, costs) of the underground structures that could be developed in Spain. Their results indicate 
that it is technically possible to accumulate up to 10.3 GtCO2 without incurring a levelized cost of 
storage14 larger than €7.2 per ton of CO2 injected. Building on their analysis, the present study considers 
the eight cost-effective candidate storage sites mentioned in Figure 1 and listed in Table 2. That table 
reveals that there are substantial variations in both the capacities and costs of the storage sites. This 
variability reinforces the need to account for storage costs in our infrastructure planning model.15 
Indeed, a simple pairing of the CO2 sources with the closest storage site may be neither feasible nor 
economically efficient.  
                                                                                                                                                          
transportation corridors that exist in northern Spain, which suggests that the incremental cost of getting them connected to a 
pipeline infrastructure should remain reasonable. (cf. Figure 1). 
14
 The levelized cost of storage is calculated as the net present value of all costs over the planning horizon (i.e., our 30-year 
period) divided by the present value of the quantities injected over that period. The levelized cost of storage is the constant 
euro storage price that would be required over the 30-year period to cover all capital expenditures, subsequent periodic 
operating expenses, and the payment of an acceptable return to investors. It should be noted that these cost figures are based 
solely on technical considerations and thus omit the possibly substantial (but hard to evaluate ex ante) cost of the measures 
needed to make a storage project socially acceptable by the local population. In case of strong local opposition, that cost 
would become prohibitive and would impose the use of another storage site.  
15
 Indeed, simply pairing the sources with the closest sinks ignores the technical constraints that may hamper the feasibility of 
such a simplistic solution and does not necessarily minimize the total system cost. 
10 
Table 2. The maximum injection rates and costs of the candidate storage sites 
[PLEASE_INSERT_TABLE_2_HERE]  
2.3 Pipelines 
A dedicated pipeline infrastructure is the only economically viable transportation solution that can 
carry the large quantities emitted by large stationary sources of CO2. In the present analysis, we 
consider a predefined list of 49 candidate pipelines (cf. Appendix A) that could be installed to connect 
the emission clusters nodes E1 to E16 with the candidate storage nodes S1 to S8. From that list of 
candidate pipelines, it is possible to build a realistic network that accounts for Spain’s mountainous 
geography (terrain, landforms, natural transportation corridors). As shown in Figure 1, these pipelines 
are located along the country’s main transportation corridors.  
From a cost perspective, we assume that the total cost to transport a given flow of CO2 on a point-
to-point pipeline system is directly proportional to the length of that pipeline and that the total cost per 
unit of distance can be decomposed into a fixed investment cost component, a variable investment cost 
one that is linearly varying with the transported flow of CO2 and a unit O&M cost. Regarding the 
pipeline investment cost components, our approach follows the costing methodology used in Morbee et 
al. (2012) and is detailed in Appendix A. For concision, we simply highlight here that for a 100km-long 
onshore pipeline aimed at being installed on a flat terrain, we assume an annual equivalent fixed cost of 
€4.6 million and an annual equivalent variable cost of €0.16 per (tCO2×100 km). As indicated in 
Appendix A, a correction is applied to these figures to account for the specific nature of terrain 
observed along each pipeline route. The obtained cost figures are thus specific to each pipeline route. 
Regarding O&M cost, IEA (2005) indicates that the annual operation costs vary between €1.0 and €2.5 
per (tCO2×100 km). In our analysis, we use a value of €1.5 per (tCO2×100 km).  
3. Optimal deployment of CCS infrastructure in Spain 
In this section, we first examine the least-cost design of CCS infrastructure aimed at storing the 
quantities of CO2 captured under the two scenarios. Then, we investigate whether the Spanish 
11 
infrastructure has to be analyzed as a unique integrated national infrastructure or whether it can be 
decomposed into a collection of regional subsystems.  
3.1 The least-costly infrastructure deployment 
We have formulated an optimization problem aimed at determining the least-costly design of a 
CCS infrastructure capable to transport and store the CO2 captured at the Spanish clusters. This model 
is formally described in Appendix B. It aims at choosing the pipelines and storage sites (among our 
predefined and finite list of candidate pipelines and storage sites) that minimize the total annual 
equivalent cost of building and operating the pipeline and storage infrastructure. More precisely, we 
adopt a static framework for the year 2040. In that year, the total national demand for capturing CO2 
and hence the annual storage requirement is imposed by our assumption. However, emitting clusters 
and storage sites need to be connected in a cost-effective manner. The model therefore seeks to 
minimize the total infrastructure cost by identifying the following optimal decisions: (i) whether, among 
a finite list of possible pipeline routes (linking either an emission cluster to a storage site, an emission 
cluster to a transit node, two emission nodes, two transit nodes, or a transit node to a storage site), a 
given corridor should be open, given its incurred fixed cost of deployment, and the transported quantity 
on that corridor given the variable operation cost; and (ii) the annual (eventually null) volume of CO2 
injected in each storage site, given an exogenous, site-dependent unit cost of storage operations. As an 
outcome, we obtain a 2040-based static picture of the optimal – in least-cost sense – CO2 pipeline 
network that matches the demand for storage with the existing capacities and possible routes. 
We have run this model on the above-mentioned input data to identify the ideal CCS infrastructure 
under our two capture scenarios. The results are illustrated in Figure 3. 
Figure 3. CO2 pipeline and storage deployment in Spain  
[PLEASE_INSERT_FIGURE_3_HERE] 
At first sight, one could conjecture from the figures detailed below the two maps that the total 
annual equivalent costs of the infrastructure per unit of CO2 transported are similar in the two scenarios 
and thus conclude that the total annual equivalent costs of the infrastructure is directly proportional to 
12 
the total flow transported. Yet, that first impression is misleading because there are marked differences 
in the cost structure of the two CCS systems. The pipeline cost figures reveal the presence of important 
economies of scale: the annual volume of CO2 transported in the scenario “All” is twice as large as the 
one in “Indus_only” though the pipeline cost is only 66% percent larger. This result is not surprising as 
the total lengths of the networks are similar, which suggests that fixed pipeline costs are spread out over 
more units of output under the scenario “All.” In contrast, one can observe that the total storage cost is 
2.77 times larger under the scenario “All” as its extra volume of CO2 saturates the capacity of the least 
costly storage sites and imposes a mobilization of the more expansive ones in S1 and S8. 
From a comparison of these two maps, several findings can be highlighted. First, whatever the 
scenario under scrutiny, the optimization model does not recommend the construction of a fully-
connected national pipeline system but rather prefers the construction of a fragmented collection of 
pipelines that are physically disconnected. Second, the morphology of some of these pipeline 
connections is scenario dependent. In the north, the clusters located at Leon (E3) and Burgos (E4) either 
form an independent infrastructure or are embedded within a larger northern infrastructure. A similar 
observation can also be made for the clusters near Valencia (E10) and Almeria (12). The emissions 
captured in Aragon (E9) are either stored in S2 together with the ones captured along the Atlantic coast 
(cf., scenario “Indus_only”) or are directed to S3 where the CO2 captured in Catalunya (E7, E8) is also 
directed (cf., scenario “All”). Hence, the optimal infrastructure deployment decided for the northern 
emission nodes and the ones located in Catalunya may not be independent. In contrast, the CO2 
captured by the emitters located in the Madrid-La Mancha area (E15) is systematically routed to the 
neighboring storage S4 located in Cuenca, and that storage site only receives CO2 from that cluster. One 
may thus wonder if a CCS deployment in E15 could be organized independently from what is decided 
in the other clusters.  
3.2 Regional subsystems 
From the graphical insights above, one could conjecture that it may be possible to decompose the 
national infrastructure into a collection of independent subsystems, that is, subsets of emissions, transit, 
and storage nodes that interact with each other to organize the CCS chain – sharing costs and possibly 
13 
connecting to each other, irrespectively of the choices made in other regions of the peninsula. To 
formally investigate this proposal and determine the boundaries of these regional subsystems, we 
successively consider the coalitions listed in Table 3. Each of these coalitions represents a candidate 
subsystem of emission areas that could potentially be separated from the national system. 
Table 3. The subsystems of emission clusters under scrutiny 
[PLEASE_INSERT_TABLE_3_HERE]  
For an emissions-transit-storage nodes subsystem, call it S , to be analyzed independently of the 
rest of the national system, we need to make sure that it does not interact with any other subgroup. From 
a cost perspective – and as described in the cost optimization model in Appendix B, this means that 
none of these other subgroups should be willing to join S  in the course of satisfying its demand for 
storage because it would reduce its average cost of serving the demand. In other words, none of the 
costs of serving S  plus another subset should be strictly subadditive, so that no economies of scale can 
emerge from sharing. 
In formal terms, we let N  denote the set of all the emission clusters considered in a given scenario 
and iQ  denote the total annual quantity of CO2 captured in cluster i . For each coalitions S , we evaluate 
two types of costs. First, by setting 0iQ =  for the emission clusters i  in the grand coalition N  but not 
in S  (i.e., for all \i N S∈ ), we can solve the mathematical programming problem in Appendix B to 
evaluate ( )C S  the stand-alone cost of serving S . This is the total cost of installing a pipeline and storage 
infrastructure optimally designed to serve the needs of the emission clusters in S . Second, we also use 
that optimization problem to assess the extra cost that this coalition S  imposes on a coalition 'S  that 
gathers emission clusters in the remaining subset (i.e., ' \S N S⊂ ). This is the incremental costs 
( ) ( )' 'C S S C S∪ −  imposed by S  on 'S . Accounting for all the possible non-empty coalitions 'S  that 
can be formed by the emission clusters in \N S  and letting \N S  denote the number of elements in 
\N S , a total of \2 1N S −  incremental costs have to be evaluated for each coalition S . If for a given 
coalition S  and any coalition 'S  in \N S , the stand-alone cost ( )C S  equals the incremental cost 
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( ) ( )' 'C S S C S∪ − , the cost function is said to be separable because it verifies ( ) ( ) ( )' 'C S S C S C S∪ = + . 
So, if these \2 1N S −  equality conditions hold, there are no cost interactions between the emission 
clusters in S  and the others in \N S  and one can separately examine the deployment of a CCS 
infrastructure aimed at solely serving S  without paying attention to the other emission clusters.  
These cost comparisons16 reveal that, among all the candidate subsystems listed in Table 3, only 
three verify the conditions for a separable cost function: (i) all the nodes located onshore on the Atlantic 
coast, and the ones in Castilla-León, Aragon, and in the Mediterranean regions of Catalunya and 
Valencia, { }E1, E2, E3, E4, E5, E6, E7, E8, E9, E10, E16 , (ii) all the nodes located in the southern regions 
of Murcia and Andalucía { }E11, E12, E13, E14 , and (iii) the emission cluster located in the Madrid-La 
Mancha area { }E15 . In the sequel, we thus partition the set of Spanish emission clusters into these three 
subgroups and independently examine the conditions for the deployment of three autonomous CCS 
infrastructures that are respectively labeled: North, South and Central. An illustration of that 
decomposition is presented in Figure 4.  
Figure 4. An illustration of the three independent subsystems  
[PLEASE_INSERT_FIGURE_4_HERE]  
The annual volumes of CO2 captured and stored at each infrastructure and the associated 
infrastructure cost under the two scenarios “All” and “Indus_only” are detailed in Table 4. The northern 
infrastructure has by far the largest potential for CO2 abatement. A rapid division of the total 
infrastructure cost by the volume of CO2 captured and stored provides the average transportation and 
storage cost. These figures indicate that the central infrastructure, which gathers a unique emission 
cluster, also has the lowest unit cost (less than 7€/tCO2 p.a. compared to figures larger than 9.3€/tCO2 
p.a. for the other infrastructures). 
Table 4. The three independent infrastructure systems 
[PLEASE_INSERT_TABLE_4_HERE]  
                                                 
16
 Results are available from the corresponding author upon request. 
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4. Methodology: A cooperative game theoretic framework 
In this section, we first provide a non-technical presentation of our cooperative game-theoretic 
framework. Then, two subsections detail the conditions that have to be verified for the construction of a 
common infrastructure to be decided. Lastly, we define the break-even CO2 price for joint CCS 
adoption and show how it can be evaluated.  
4.1 Cooperative game and stability notion 
We consider a regional subsystem of emission clusters, like the ones identified in the preceding 
section, and examine the conditions for the construction of the least-cost (not necessarily fully-
connected) CCS infrastructure in that subsystem, also identified in the previous section.  
Hereafter, N  refers to the grand coalition joining all the emission clusters in that subsystem: either
{ }E11, E12, E13, E14N =  in the southern region, { }E1, E2, E3, E4, E5, E6, E7, E8, E9, E10, E16N =  in the 
northern region or { }E15N =  in the central one. 
By nature, a CO2 pipeline and storage system is a mutualized infrastructure and its cost must be 
apportioned between all the individuals that feed CO2 into that system. In this paper, we assume that 
each emission cluster represents an autonomous decision-making entity that can either feed all the 
volumes of CO2 captured by the local emitters to the grand infrastructure, feed them to a different 
infrastructure or renounce CO2 capture. The arrangements guiding the internal functioning of that 
emission cluster will be further discussed below. For the moment, we simply overlook that issue and 
treat all the emitters in a given emission cluster as a monolithic agent, that is, as an individual player. 
Following the cooperative game theoretic approach in Young (1985), the players are considered to 
negotiate with each other to determine a binding agreement between them regarding the sharing of the 
total cost of building and operating the grand infrastructure. To examine the different possibilities 
within a game for cooperation among players, we must evaluate what cost can collectively be incurred 
by any subgroup of players S  in the set N . Indeed, if a certain subgroup of players assesses that it pays 
more than it could do by itself then this group may abandon the negotiations with the other players and 
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opt for a stand-alone attitude (i.e., develop its own infrastructure). Our ambition is thus to identify 
whether or not it is possible to share the total cost of the grand infrastructure in such a manner that no 
subgroup of players has an incentive to disband. Such a cost allocation is said to belong to the “core” of 
the cost game. 
We shall now specify what a given coalition S  can achieve if it decides to opt out from the grand 
coalition and build an infrastructure aimed solely at serving its own needs. To do so, one should first 
examine the economic features of the shared elements of the CCS supply chain: the pipeline network 
and the storage site. Regarding transportation, the technology used in CO2 pipelines is not proprietary. 
Potentially, several pipeline firms may have access to the same technology and may install a pipeline 
system between a group of emission clusters and some storage sites. In contrast, excludability can be at 
work on the storage side. At a given storage site, the quantity of CO2 that can be injected by S  plus the 
total volume injected by the other emission clusters in \N S  cannot exceed the capacity constraint of that 
storage. Such a capacity constraint creates a mutual influence among coalitions, a feature called an 
externality among coalitions. In the presence of externalities, the players who are about to deviate must 
take into account the behavior of the remaining agents because the cost incurred by the deviating 
coalition – thus the incentive to disband – can vary with the decisions taken by these remaining agents.  
Several options can be envisaged to determine the cost incurred by a deviating coalition S  that 
varies with the behavior posited for the remaining agents in \N S . Most of the literature on cooperative 
game theory in the presence of externalities makes one of the following two extreme assumptions. 
Some papers assume that non-deviating members would stay together (e.g., Horn and Persson, 2001) 
whereas others assume that they would split apart (e.g., Barros, 1998; Chander and Tulkens, 1997).17 In 
this paper, we take the first approach because we think it is more likely that the remaining coalition 
members would build a joint infrastructure than they would build many, separate ones independently. 
The remaining members of the grand coalition are more likely to have assessed the feasibility of a joint 
project (including geoscience studies, pipeline routing analyses, permitting procedures).  
                                                 
17
 Very few papers consider the optimal reaction of the non-deviating coalition members (an exception involving a game with 
only three players is Banal-Estañol et al., 2008). 
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We use this observation to model the strategic behavior between the two coalitions ( \N S  and S). 
We assume that the remaining players in the grand coalition (i.e., the ones in \N S) collectively conserve 
a first-mover advantage. That is, they can decide the construction of the least costly CCS infrastructure 
aimed at serving their own needs without taking into account the volume injected by the other emission 
cluster in the storage capacity constraint. 
We implement these assumptions as follows. First, we determine the optimal transport and storage 
decisions of the remaining coalition \N S  by solving an instance of the optimization problem in 
Appendix B where the annual emissions captured by the deviating clusters are 0iQ =  for all i  in S . 
The solution of that mathematical programming problem provides the decision vector chosen by \N S  
and thus the quantities injected at each storage site. Then, we assume that the deviating coalition S  
observes the injection decisions of its complement \N S  and takes them as given by playing its best 
response to these injection decisions.18 By replicating that two-stage numerical procedure for each of 
the 2 2N −  coalitions S  with S N⊂  and S ≠ ∅  and S N≠  that can be formed, we are able to determine 
the cost ( )*C S  that would be incurred by a deviating coalition S .19 To ease the notation, we also let 
( ) ( )*C N C N= . 
4.2 The core of the cooperative cost game 
We now assume that the pipeline and storage infrastructure aimed at serving the needs of the grand 
coalition N  is supplied by a unique operator. The total cost incurred by that operator is ( )C N . We let 
( )1,..., Nr r r=  where ir  is the amount charged to the emission cluster i , denote the revenue vector 
                                                 
18
 Technically, this is done by solving an adapted version of the optimization problem in Appendix B where the annual 
emissions captured by the remaining clusters are set to zero (i.e., 0iQ =  for all i  in \N S ) and the capacity level at each 
storage site is the difference between the physical capacity and the quantity already injected by the remaining players in 
\N S . 
19
 Note that this procedure is computationally demanding because, for each deviating coalition S , it requires to sequentially 
solve two instances of the mixed integer linear programming problem presented in appendix B: one to determine the behavior 
of the complement coalition and one for the deviating coalition. 
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charged by that operator. We assume that this operator is compelled to charge a revenue vector that 
allows him to recover its cost and thus: 
( )*i
i N
r C N
∈
=∑ .            (1)  
Each coalition of emission clusters S  compares: 
ii S
r
∈∑  the amounts charged by the operator with 
( )*C S  the cost it would incur by deviating and adopting a stand-alone attitude. The condition for all 
coalitions to rationally remain in the grand coalition is:  
( )*i
i S
r C S
∈
≤∑ ,   S N∀ ⊂ , { },S N∉ ∅ .      (2) 
The set of revenue vectors that verifies conditions (1) and (2) is named the core of the cooperative 
cost game ( )*,N C . From an empirical perspective, it is possible to verify that the core is not empty by 
using a linear programming approach similar to the one presented in Massol et al. (2015, Appendix B). 
The non-emptiness of the core indicates that it is possible for the infrastructure operator to charge a 
revenue vector that allows him to recover its cost while preventing the secession of the players.  
4.3 The individual conditions required for CCS adoption  
We now examine the emission clusters’ decision to adopt the proposed CCS project. We let iχ  
denote the unit cost of the carbon capture operations conducted at cluster i . The definition of that unit 
capture cost will be further discussed in a subsequent section.  
For any emission cluster i , the amount ( )2CO i ip Qχ−  represents its willingness to pay for a CO2 
pipeline and storage service and, thus, the amount ( )2CO i i ip Q rχ− −  is its individual net benefit. Because 
of individual rationality, the infrastructure operator must provide a non-negative net benefit to each 
individual emission cluster, i.e.:  
( )2 0CO i i ip Q rχ− − ≥ ,   i N∀ ∈ .      (3) 
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4.4 The break-even price for joint CCS adoption 
The analysis in Massol et al. (2015) shows that the condition for the pipeline operator to be able 
to build the grand infrastructure amounts to set a revenue vector that verifies conditions (1), (2), and (3). 
The prevailing carbon price has a direct influence on the individual net benefit of the emission clusters 
and thus on the possibility for the infrastructure operator to determine such an incentive-compatible 
revenue vector. We thus define 
2
*
COp  the break-even price for joint CCS adoption as the critical value in 
the charge for CO2 emissions that would be compatible with the satisfaction of the three conditions. 
This break-even price is the solution of the following linear program LP1: 
LP1:  
2
,
Min
COr p
 
2COp          (4) 
  s.t. ( )*i
i N
r C N
∈
=∑ ,        (5) 
( )*i
i S
r C S
∈
≤∑ ,   { }\ ,S N N∀ ⊂ ∅ ,   (6) 
( )2 0CO i i ip Q rχ− − ≥ ,   i N∀ ∈ .     (7) 
5. Data: The cost of the carbon capture operations 
5.1 Data: The unit capture costs of the industrial sectors 
The cost to build and operate carbon capture equipment is specific to each industrial sector 
(Leeson et al., 2017). In this paper, we assume the unit capture costs listed in Table 5 that are based on 
recent cost engineering analyses. These figures confirm that CO2 capture is extremely expensive in the 
oil refining sector. In the other industrial sectors, the magnitude of the capture cost is commensurate 
with the ones observed in the power sector. 
Table 5. The sector-specific capture costs 
[PLEASE_INSERT_TABLE_5_HERE]  
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5.2 Cluster agreements and average vs. marginal costs  
We consider two extreme assumptions regarding the arrangement guiding the internal functioning 
of the emission clusters. We first assume that transfers between individual plants in each cluster are 
feasible. In this case, the individual plants of each cluster will consider the average costs of the plants in 
the cluster and the overall gains to the cluster in any given coalition, as side payments can be made 
from the lowest to the highest cost plants to compensate the plants with higher costs. Under that first 
assumption, iχ  the unit cost of the carbon capture operations conducted at cluster i  is defined as the 
volume-weighted average capture cost at that cluster: 
ij ij
j
i
ij
j
Q
Q
χ
χ =
∑
∑
.           (8) 
where ijQ  is the annual quantity of CO2 captured by the plants in industrial sector j  in cluster i . 
As side payments can be difficult to organize, we also consider a second assumption without 
transfers. In this case, the highest cost plant will be key as the gains obtained by any plant will need to 
compensate its costs. We are de facto assuming that each individual plant has veto power in the cluster. 
Under that second assumption, iχ  the unit cost of the carbon capture operations conducted at cluster i  
is thus defined as follows: 
Max i ijjχ χ= .           (9) 
Of course, the reality is somewhere between these two extremes. Still, the differences between 
them will help us understand how crucial side payments are to the deployment of CCS in Spain.  
5.3 The unit capture cost at each industrial cluster  
Using the unit costs listed in Table 5, in each cluster we constructed the merit order of the local 
carbon capture units to calculate the unit capture cost iχ  at each industrial cluster under the two 
scenarios: “All” and “Indus_only.” We successively use the two alternative assumptions presented 
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above: iχ  is either defined as the volume-weighted average capture cost at that industrial cluster, or the 
unit capture cost observed at the plant that has the most expansive carbon capture technology among all 
the plants in the industrial cluster. These figures are detailed in Table 6.  
Observe that in some clusters the difference between the two approaches retained to evaluate the 
capture costs can be substantial. This difference is particularly salient under the scenario “All” for all 
the clusters with oil refining activities ( )E1, E5, E8, E10, E11, E13, E14 . At these clusters, the non-oil-
refining sectors will perceive large infra-marginal rents if these players refuse to organize some side 
payments but that strategy also conveys the risk of substantially raising the break-even price of CO2 
needed for the construction of the infrastructure.  
Table 6. The unit capture cost iχ  at each cluster 
[PLEASE_INSERT_TABLE_6_HERE]  
6. Results and discussion 
We now use these unit capture costs together with the transportation and storage costs evaluated 
with the optimization model in Appendix B to evaluate the break-even price for joint CCS adoption. For 
each scenario (“All”, “Indus_only”) and each candidate infrastructure (North, Central, South), we run 
two instances of the linear programming problem LP1: one assuming that the unit capture cost at each 
industrial cluster is based on the quantity-weighted average value, and one assuming that this cost 
equals the marginal value, as shown in equations (8) and (9). The results are presented in Table 7. 
Table 7. The break-even price for CCS adoption 
2
*
COp  (€/tCO2) 
[PLEASE_INSERT_TABLE_7_HERE]  
These results convey a series of interesting findings. First, one can compare the break-even prices 
obtained under the two scenarios for a given assumption regarding the unit capture costs. Interestingly, 
the break-even prices are slightly lower under the “Indus_only” scenario despite substantially lower 
volumes of CO2 over which the fixed costs of the network and storage infrastructure can be spread. This 
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is an important finding as it suggests that CCS can remain a competitive decarbonization option even if 
the power sector massively opts for renewable energy sources and thus abandons the carbon capture 
technology. Of course, this result also suggests to concentrate on the “low hanging fruits” by selecting 
only the industries where the installation of carbon capture technologies is affordable (i.e., by omitting 
the oil refining sector).  
Second, as can be expected, we can see that the required price for the deployment of a CCS 
infrastructure can be large, especially in the north and south subsystems that gather several emission 
clusters. This is particularly true for the scenario in which all plants are included (“All”), and in the case 
of a no-transfer agreement (“marginal”).  
Third, as can be expected again, one can note that under a given scenario the break-even prices are 
a bit lower for the quantity-weighted case, as it avoids the veto power of the highest cost plant. It is 
interesting to highlight that the magnitude of the difference between the marginal and quantity-weighted 
cases is substantially smaller under the scenario “Indus_only.” By construction, this finding is a direct 
consequence of the unit capture costs listed in Table 6, yet it suggests that the detailed outcomes of the 
internal bargaining conducted within each cluster are likely to play a less important role under the 
scenario “Indus_only.”  
As a side remark, we note that there is no difference between the marginal and quantity-weighted 
price in the north subsystem in the “Indus_only” scenario. For that specific scenario, we have closely 
examined the two solutions of the linear program LP1. By construction, the solution of LP1 is such that 
at least one of the nine constraints (7) – recall that they state that the individual net benefit of each 
emission cluster must be non-negative – must be binding. Interestingly, in both cases, there is a unique 
binding constraint: the one associated with the emission cluster E1 located in A Coruña in Galicia. 
Under the scenario “Indus_only,” there is only one industrial sector in that cluster (an iron and steel 
plant – see Figure 2) which explains why the unit capture cost at that cluster equals 57.5€/tCO2 both 
under the volume-weighted average and marginal methods. The difference between the break-even 
price and that unit capture cost reveals that a unit amount of 25.12€/tCO2 is charged to this cluster by 
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the infrastructure operator when the prevailing carbon price equals
2
*
COp . This figure is far larger than 
the average cost of the infrastructure: 442/41.9 ≈ 10.55€/tCO2 suggested from the figures in Table 4. A 
closer examination of the solution of LP1 reveals that this figure is exactly equal to the incremental cost 
that E1 imposes on the other emission clusters in the north. Hence, this is the lowest amount that can be 
charged by the pipeline operator without creating an opportunity for the other emitters to disband. By 
the way, a quick look at the location of that cluster on the map presented in Figure 4 suggests that this 
large incremental cost is not so surprising given the relatively small size of that cluster and its remote 
location (relative to those of the storage site S2). 
Beyond the somehow anecdotal nature of that discussion centered on the case of the cluster E1, 
this analysis strongly questions the validity of the simple accounting-based or cost-engineering-based 
studies that evaluate the average total cost of a CCS supply chain (by simply dividing the total 
infrastructure cost by the total quantity stored) and implicitly presume that this figure can be interpreted 
as the critical price of CO2 required to trigger the construction of the CCS infrastructure. For example, 
Table 8 reports two values that could be retained in these simple cost-engineering studies that overlook 
the complex cost interactions which exist in an infrastructure that has network characteristics. These 
values are: (i) the simple average cost of the infrastructure (to reflect the case where internal bargaining 
can be conducted within the clusters), and (ii) the sum of the unit capture cost at the most expensive 
plant connected to the infrastructure plus the average cost of the pipeline and storage infrastructure (to 
reflect the case where side-payments cannot be implemented within the clusters). While the average 
cost and highest capture costs are representative of the break-even price for the simple, mono-node 
infrastructure Central, this is clearly not the case when one considers the more complex infrastructures 
of North and South. For these infrastructures, the difference with the break-even price 
2
*
COp  is 
substantial and the figures derived from simple accounting reasoning substantially underestimate the 
true break-even price capable of creating the conditions for a cooperative adoption of the CCS 
technology by all the emission clusters connected to the infrastructure. This means that not taking into 
account the strategic incentives may lead to a significant underestimation of the difficulties of 
deploying a CCS infrastructure that connects several emission sources. 
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Table 8. The simple cost metrics derived from accounting reasoning (€/tCO2) 
[PLEASE_INSERT_TABLE_8_HERE]  
7. Conclusion and policy implications 
The question of how to organize the construction of a large-scale CO2 pipeline and storage system 
is one of the key issues that policymakers must address to support the large-scale deployment of Carbon 
Capture and Storage (CCS) technologies. Previous research on that issue has two limitations that 
together provide the motivation for the present paper, namely (i) the potential failure of a widespread 
adoption of CCS in power generation and oil refining sectors, as well as (ii) the need to account for the 
coordination of actors along the chain to ensure a viable and mutually agreed cooperation at the 
regional level. This paper thus adopts a spatial approach to clarify the conditions that make the 
construction of a common pipeline and storage infrastructure with network characteristics a rational 
move for a set of regional clusters of industrial emitters that could be connected to that infrastructure. It 
also examines whether these conditions differ or not depending on the installation of carbon capture 
capabilities in the energy sector (i.e., at power plants, at oil refineries). 
Taking Spain as a case study, the paper examines the least costly deployment of a national CCS 
infrastructure under these two scenarios. A closer analysis of their cost structures (i.e., on the 
separability of the cost function) reveals an important finding: this national infrastructure can be 
decomposed into three regionally distinct subsystems located in the north, center and south of Spain, 
meaning that under no circumstance of the scenarios under scrutiny does a pipeline link any pair of 
these regions. As these subsystems can be deployed independently, there is no need to concentrate the 
policymakers’ attention on the construction of a grand infrastructure with national scope, but rather a 
regional approach with respect to the implementation of CCS should be favored.  
The paper then examines the economic feasibility of these regional subsystems. Using an adapted 
cooperative game-theoretic framework, we model the outcomes of the negotiations among the emission 
clusters that can be connected to these infrastructures and use it to determine the critical values in the 
charge for CO2 emissions that makes their constructions possible: the break-even prices for CCS 
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adoption. A comparison of these break-even prices provides a series of interesting findings from a 
policymaking perspective. Firstly, the non-adoption of CCS technologies in the energy sector does not 
make the cost of CCS prohibitive. Accordingly, the current lack of progress of CCS in the energy sector 
should not discourage its implementation in the other industrial sector (provided sufficient incentives 
can be set). Secondly, we found that the internal bargaining conducted within each cluster regarding the 
sharing of the carbon capture cost plays a less important role when the infrastructure stores solely the 
CO2 captured at industrial sites (i.e., when the energy sector is not present). We believe that this finding 
results from a greater homogeneity of the sector-specific costs to implement carbon capture capabilities. 
Lastly, this analysis calls for further attention to be paid to the network characteristics of the CCS 
supply chain when trying to infer the break-even price of these infrastructures. Indeed, preliminary cost-
engineering studies based on average cost concepts may substantially underestimate the true break-even 
price.  
As in any modeling effort, we made simplifying assumptions. We, for instance, neglected the role 
of uncertainty regarding CO2 prices. As investments in carbon capture capabilities are irreversible, the 
presence of uncertainty can influence the emitters’ individual decisions and thus the feasibility of a 
shared infrastructure. Risk-averse owners may thus require a higher premium to compensate for the risk 
of the investment. Further research could explore whether individual decisions based on a real-options 
framework can be combined with the cooperative game theoretic approach presented in this manuscript 
to gain further insights into the development of a CCS infrastructure. Incorporating the system effects 
of individual decisions (and thus the interactions) within a real-option framework, though, can be a 
challenging task. 
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Appendix A – Emission clusters and candidate pipelines 
The emission clusters 
We build upon the results gained from the EU-funded COMET project to group emitters into 
clusters of reasonable size. From a database including the technical characteristics and geographical 
location of the Spanish stationary sources that emitted more than 0.1 Mt CO2/a during the years 2005–
10, the COMET team conducted an exhaustive clustering exercise that resulted in the identification of 
56 sources of CO2 in Spain that aggregate the emissions of the neighboring industries and power plants. 
They then simulated the future emission trajectories of each of these industrial sectors, using a detailed 
integrated bottom-up model of the Iberian energy system based on the TIMES framework (Kanudia et 
al., 2013). From their simulation results,20 it appears that 23 sources account for the largest share of the 
nation’s industrial emissions of CO2 and offer the most promising prospects for the installation of 
carbon capture capabilities. As some of these sources are geographically very close, we have further 
regrouped them into 16 distinct clusters labeled E1 to E16. The following table clarifies the 
construction of our industrial clusters from the sources of CO2 considered in the COMET project.  
Table A.1. Correspondence between our industrial clusters and the sources of CO2 used in the 
COMET project 
[PLEASE_INSERT_TABLE A.1_HERE]  
 
The candidate pipelines and their costs 
Definition  
Each pipeline connects two of 37 nodes: the 16 emission clusters nodes E1 to E16, the eight 
storage nodes S1 to S8 and the 13 intersection nodes labeled R1 to R13 that are listed in Table A.2. The 
later nodes represent possible network intersections between at least three pipelines. There are no CO2 
injection into/withdrawal from the network at these nodes.  
                                                 
20
 We are grateful to Dr. Amit Kanudia (KanORS) for having kindly shared with us the detailed results of the numerous 
simulations he conducted for the COMET project. 
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Table A.2. The intersection nodes 
[PLEASE_INSERT_TABLE_A.2_HERE]  
Table A.3. presents the candidate pipelines, their lengths and the dimensionless average terrain-
correction factors τ  that will be needed to evaluate the transportation costs. In our study, the average 
terrain correction factors were obtained by associating each kilometer of pipeline with the values 
indicated in IEAGHG (2002): e.g., 1.5 for mountainous terrain, 1.1 for agricultural land. 
Table A.3. The candidate pipelines 
[PLEASE_INSERT_TABLE_A.3_HERE]  
 
The pipeline investment cost 
We follow the standard methodology retained in CO2 pipeline models and assume that the 
construction cost of a point-to-point pipeline infrastructure is directly proportional to its length. We thus 
consider a normalized cost per unit of length and assume that this cost can be evaluated as follows.  
To evaluate the total annual equivalent investment cost of a 100km-long pipeline, we use the 
pipeline investment cost formula detailed in Morbee et al. (2012) to obtain the total capital expenditures 
and convert them into an annual equivalent cost using a 7% discount rate and assuming an 
infrastructure lifetime of 30 years. The annual equivalent investment cost of a 100km-long pipeline that 
has a steady annual output of q MtCO2/year is: ( )0 0A B q τ+ , where 0 4.6045A =  is the fixed cost 
coefficient (in million 2015 euros),21 the variable cost coefficient is 0 0.1641B =  in 2015 euros per 
(tCO2×100 km) and τ  is the average terrain correction factor described in IEAGHG (2002) and 
detailed in Table A.2.  
                                                 
21
 Original monetary values are in 2010 euros and were corrected for inflation to obtain 2015 euros. 
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Appendix B – Designing an optimal pipeline-storage infrastructure 
This Appendix details the optimization problem used to evaluate the least-cost design of a given 
pipeline-storage infrastructure. We first present the notations before presenting the mathematical 
formulation of that problem.  
Notation 
To begin with, we define three sets to identify the nodes of the network: 
• { }1,..., ,...,N i N=  the set gathering the clusters where the captured emissions are 
injected into the network; 
• { }1,..., ,...,K k K=  the set gathering the storage nodes where CO2 is withdrawn from the 
network to be injected in a saline aquifer; 
• { }1,..., ,...,R r R=  the set of the network routing nodes that are neither connected to an 
emission cluster nor to a storage site. These nodes typically represent an intersection 
between several pipeline links.  
The three sets are mutually exclusive so: N K∩ = ∅  , K R∩ = ∅  and N R∩ = ∅ . For 
notational convenience, we also let N K RΖ = ∪ ∪  denote the macro-set regrouping all the nodes and 
z  is used as a generic notation for a given node in Z . We also let { }1,..., ,...,P p P=  denote the set 
of candidate pipeline links.  
We now present the exogenous parameters. 
• iQ  is the total quantity captured and injected into the network at cluster i ;  
• kQ  is the maximum amount of CO2 that can be withdrawn from the network to be injected 
into storage k; 
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• 
,p zI  is an incidence parameter that only takes three values: -1 if pipeline p  starts at node 
z , 1 if pipeline p  ends at node z , and 0 otherwise; 
• 
pipe
pF  is the fixed cost incurred to open the pipeline link p ; 
• 
pipe
pC  is the unit cost incurred by using pipeline p ; 
• 
inj
kC  is the unit cost of the CO2 injection operations conducted at storage k; 
• M  is an arbitrarily large constant. Its value will be discussed below. 
The decision variables are: 
• pδ  is a binary variable that describes whether the pipeline link p  is opened (i.e., 1pδ = ) 
or closed (i.e., 0pδ = ); 
• pq
+
 (respectively pq− ) is the non-negative quantity transported using pipeline p  that flows 
in the direction posited for pipeline p  (respectively in the opposite direction); 
• 
inj
kq  is the non-negative quantity injected into storage k. 
For notational simplicity, we also let ( ), , , injN p p p kx q q qδ + −=  be the decision vector to transport 
and store the emissions captured at the clusters in N .  
Optimization problem 
The cost-minimizing design of an infrastructure gathering the emissions captured at the emissions 
clusters in N  and transporting them to the storage site can be determined using the following 
optimization problem:  
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MILP1:  Min
Nx
 ( )pipe pipe inj injp p p p p k k
p P k K
F C q q C qδ + −
∈ ∈
 + + + ∑ ∑      (B.1) 
  s.t. ( ), 0p i p p i
p P
I q q Q+ −
∈
− + =∑ ,   i N∀ ∈ ,    (B.2) 
( ), injp k p p k
p P
I q q q+ −
∈
− =∑ ,   k K∀ ∈ ,    (B.3) 
( ), 0p r p p
p P
I q q+ −
∈
− =∑ ,   r R∀ ∈ ,    (B.4) 
p p pq q Mδ+ −+ ≤ ,    p P∀ ∈ ,    (B.5) 
inj
k kq Q≤ ,    k K∀ ∈ ,    (B.6) 
0injkq ≥ ,    k K∀ ∈   and  { }0,1pδ ∈ , 0pq + ≥ , 0pq − ≥ ,  p P∀ ∈ . (B.7) 
In this mixed-integer linear programming problem, the objective function (B.1) to be minimized is 
the sum of the total pipeline cost and the storage annual equivalent cost. The constraints (B.2), (B.3) 
and (B.4) respectively represent the mass balance equations at the source, storage, and intersection 
nodes. For each pipeline p , the constraint (B.5) forces the binary variable pδ  to be equal to 1 
whenever a positive quantity of gas is flowing into that pipeline (whatever the flow direction) and 
imposes a zero flow whenever it is optimal not to build it.22 The constraints (B.6) represent the sink 
injectivity constraints: at each storage node, the quantity injected cannot exceed the local injection 
                                                 
22
 It should be noted that the value of the parameter M  is arbitrarily set at a level that is large enough for the constraint (B.5) 
to be non-binding whenever the pipeline is built and 1pδ = . In the present case, we assume that M  equals 10 times the sum 
of the quantity of CO2 injected at all nodes (i.e., ii NM Q∈=∑ ). Introducing that linear constraint provides important 
computational benefits. Without that constraint, one would have had to introduce the non-linear term 
( )pipe pipep p p p pF C q q δ+ − + +   in the pipeline cost component of the objective function (B.1) which is logically equivalent but 
computationally far more challenging to solve. As the cooperative game theoretic analysis that will be developed in this paper 
requires solving a total of 2n instances of that optimization model, we cannot overlook these computational issues. This type of 
linear reformulations are very popular in the operations research (O.R.) and modeling literatures and are usually nicknamed 
« big M » constraints in that community’s jargon.  
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capacity. We let *Nx  be the solution to that problem. Observe that this solution is such that on each 
pipeline p , at least one of the two directed flows *pq+  and *pq−  must be equal to zero.23  
One can note that this specification accounts for the storage injection constraints but ignores the 
fact that storage operations could also be limited by the cumulated volume that can be injected at a 
storage site. This simplification has been adopted because of the relative magnitudes of the volume and 
injection capacities of the storage sites listed in Table 2. Remarking that on each storage site, an annual 
injection flow set at the injection capacity during 30 years (i.e., the duration of our planning horizon) 
systematically yields a cumulated volume CO2 that is strictly lower than the site’s total volume, we 
have decided to omit that constraint to limit the size of the optimization problem and thus the overall 
computational time (recall that this model must be solved for every possible coalition of emission 
clusters that can be formed).  
Overall, this mixed-integer linear programming problem is similar to the pipeline routing problem 
examined in Morbee et al. (2012) but, in contrast to their model, ours uses a simpler static time 
representation (i.e., a single representative year) but conveys a richer representation of the transport-
storage interactions. The objective function posited in the original model considers solely the pipeline 
cost (and thus implicitly neglects the possibility to observe cost differences among the various storage 
sites) whereas total storage costs are explicitly accounted for in the objective function of the present 
model. Hence, the solution to our model does not necessarily pair each cluster with the closest storage 
site: it can opt for the installation of a longer pipeline system if the extra pipeline cost is more than 
compensated by a lower storage cost. 
                                                 
23 Indeed, we assume that *Nx  is a solution and that there is at least one pipeline 'p  with 
*
'
0pq
+ >
 and *
'
0pq
− > , we 
consider the decision vector **Nx  where the pipeline flows are the net non-negative flows in each direction 
** * *
' ' '
max( ,0)p p pq q q+ + −= − , ** * *' ' 'max( ,0)p p pq q q− − += −  and the other variables have the same values as the ones in 
*
Nx . By construction, 
**
Nx  also verifies the constraints (B.2)-(B.7) while yielding a lower value for the objective function 
(B.1) because ** ** * *
' ' ' 'p p p pq q q q
+ − + −+ = −  and thus ( ) ( )** ** * *' ' ' ' ' 'pipe pipep p p p p pC q q C q q+ − + −+ < + . Hence, we have a 
contradiction because *Nx  cannot be a solution of the optimization problem. 
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Table 1. The emission clusters 
Label Location Region Label Location Region 
E1 A Coruña Galicia E9 Zaragoza Aragón 
E2 Oviedo-Gijón Asturias E10 Valencia Valencia 
E3 León Castilla-León E11 Cartagena Murcia 
E4 Burgos Castilla-León E12 Almería Andalucía 
E5 Bilbao Euskadi E13 Algeciras Andalucía 
E6 Pamplona Navarra E14 Huelva Andalucía 
E7 Barcelona Catalunya E15 La Mancha Castilla–La Mancha 
E8 Tarragona Catalunya E16 Santander Cantabria 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2. The maximum injection rates and costs of the candidate storage sites 
Cluster Cluster name Region 
Storage 
volume 
(MtCO2) 
Maximum 
injection rate 
(MtCO2/a) 
Levelized 
storage costs 
(investment 
and O&M)  
(€/tCO2) 
S1 Aranda de Duero Castilla-León 568 10.3  6.83  
S2 Logroño Rioja 4,161 35.7  3.36  
S3 Alcañiz Aragon 2,040 75.8  7.16  
S4 Cuenca Castilla-La Mancha 1,035 16.5  4.03  
S5 Almansa Castilla-La Mancha 959 15.5  2.69  
S6 Moratalla Murcia 413 7.3  1.57  
S7 Ubeda Andalucía 1,082 25.5  1.57  
S8 Reinosa Cantabria 54 1.7  6.94  
Source: Carneiro et al. (2015). Levelized cost are evaluated for a 30-year injection period assuming a steady rate of injection 
and a real discount rate of 7 percent. Original monetary values are in 2007 euros and were corrected for inflation to obtain 
2015 euros. 
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Table 3. The subsystems of emission clusters under scrutiny 
Name of the candidate subsystem Nodes 
All the nodes located onshore the Atlantic coast, 
and the ones in Castilla-León, Aragon, and in the 
Mediterranean regions of Catalunya and Valencia. 
{E1, E2, E3, E4, E5, E6, E7, E8, E9, 
E10, E16} 
All the nodes located in the southern regions of 
Murcia and Andalucía. 
{E11, E12, E13, E14} 
All the nodes located in the Catalunya and Aragon 
regions. 
{E7, E8, E9} 
All the northern nodes located along the Atlantic 
coast. 
{E1, E2, E16, E5, E6} 
The Madrid-La Mancha area alone. {E15} 
The Valencia area alone. {E10} 
The Murcia region alone. {E11} 
The Almeria area alone. {E12} 
The Madrid-La Mancha area alone. {E15} 
 
 
 
Table 4. The three independent infrastructure systems 
Infrastructure 
Scenario “All” Scenario “Indus_only” 
Total volume of CO2 
captured and stored 
(MtCO2/year) 
Total annual 
equivalent cost 
(in million euros) 
Total volume of CO2 
captured and stored 
(MtCO2/year) 
Total annual 
equivalent cost 
(in million euros) 
Central 9.2 63.0 8.0 55.8 
South 24.9 233.5 7.5 88.9 
North 78.6 864.3  41.9 442.0 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5. The sector-specific capture costs 
Sector Unit capture cost (€/tCO2) Source 
Cement 29.6 Leeson et al. (2017) 
Iron & Steel 57.5 Leeson et al. (2017) 
Pulp & Paper 44.3 Leeson et al. (2017) 
Oil refining 96.3 DNV (2010) 
Coal Power Plant 
(supercritical pulverized coal) 36.0 Rubin et al. (2015) 
Natural Gas Power Plant 51.0 Rubin et al. (2015) 
Note: The original values are in US dollars and have been converted into 2015 euros using the mean annualized exchange 
rate obtained from the International Monetary Fund. 
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Table 6. The unit capture cost iχ  at each cluster 
  
Scenario  
“All” 
Scenario 
 “Indus_only" 
Cluster 
Label 
Cluster  
name 
Volume-
weighted 
approach 
(€/tCO2) 
Highest cost 
approach 
(€/tCO2) 
Volume-
weighted 
approach 
(€/tCO2) 
Highest cost 
approach 
(€/tCO2) 
E1 A Coruña  57.22   96.30   57.50   57.50  
E2 Oviedo-Gijón  45.06   57.50   47.34   57.50  
E3 Leon  35.35   51.00   29.60   29.60  
E4 Burgos  37.06   57.50   31.69   57.50  
E5 Bilbao  59.62   96.30   34.99   57.50  
E6 Pamplona  38.64   57.50   37.66   57.50  
E7 Barcelona  34.63   57.50   32.22   57.50  
E8 Tarragona  78.44   96.30  # # 
E9 Zaragoza  40.18   51.00   39.97   44.30  
E10 Valencia  42.43   96.30   29.60   29.60  
E11 Cartagena  49.60   96.30  # # 
E12 Almeria  37.26   51.00   29.60   29.60  
E13 Algeciras  57.19   96.30  # # 
E14 Huelva  48.20   96.30   41.63   44.30  
E15 La Mancha  32.33   51.00   29.60   29.60  
E16 Santander  53.35   57.50  # # 
Note: # indicates that there are no carbon capture operations conducted at that industrial cluster under the scenario 
“Indus_only” (see the discussion in Section 2). 
 
 
 
 
Table 7. The break-even price for CCS adoption 
2
*
COp  (€/tCO2) 
 
Note: (a) These results were obtained using the linear program LP1 and the unit capture costs defined using equation 
Erreur ! Source du renvoi introuvable.. (b) These results were obtained using the linear program LP1 and the unit capture 
costs defined using equation Erreur ! Source du renvoi introuvable.. 
 
Scenario "All" Scenario "Indus_only" 
 
iχ
 
Quantity-weighted (a)
 
iχ
 
Marginal (b)
 
iχ
 
Quantity-weighted (a)
 
iχ
 
Marginal (b)
 
North 89.01 114.25 82.62 82.62 
  difference  +28.4%  +0.0% 
Central 39.17 57.84 36.54 36.54 
  difference  +47.7%  +0.0% 
South 68.12 107.23 53.46 56.13 
  difference  +57.4%  +4.99% 
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Table 8. The simple cost metrics derived from accounting reasoning (€/tCO2) 
 
Note: (a) These results were obtained using the formula ( )*ij ij ii N j i NQ C N Qχ∈ ∈ + ∑ ∑ ∑ . (b) These results were 
obtained using the formula ( )*Maxij ij ii NC N Qχ ∈+ ∑ . 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A.1. Correspondence between our industrial clusters and the sources of CO2 used in the 
COMET project 
Cluster 
Label 
Cluster  
name 
Region 
Correspondence with the 
sources of CO2 used in 
the COMET project 
E1 A Coruña Galicia C03, C17 
E2 Oviedo-Gijón Asturias C01, C02 
E3 Leon Castilla-León C04, C18 
E4 Burgos Castilla-León C49, C12 
E5 Bilbao Euskadi C24 
E6 Pamplona Navarra C23 
E7 Barcelona Catalunya C11 
E8 Tarragona Catalunya C27 
E9 Zaragoza Aragon C45, C46, C38, C36 
E10 Valencia Valencia C30 
E11 Cartagena Murcia C09 
E12 Almeria Andalucía C34 
E13 Algeciras Andalucía C22 
E14 Huelva Andalucía C30 
E15 La Mancha Castilla-La Mancha C05 
E16 Santander Cantabria C31 
 
Scenario "All" Scenario "Indus_only" 
 
Average cost 
(a)
 
Highest capture 
cost + average 
pipeline and 
storage cost (b) 
Average cost 
(a)
 
Highest capture 
cost + average 
pipeline and 
storage cost (b) 
North 56.60 107.30 48.50 68.06 
  Difference with 
2
*
COp   -36.4% -6.1% -41.3% -17.6% 
Central 39.17 57.84 36.54 36.54 
   Difference with 
2
*
COp  0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
South 57.07 105.68 48.67 56.11 
   Difference with 
2
*
COp  -16.2% -1.4% -9.0% 0.0% 
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Table A.2. The intersection nodes 
Node Name Region Node Name Region 
R1 Miranda de Ebro Castilla y Leon R8 Osorno Castilla y Leon 
R2 Alfaro La Rioja R9 Córdoba Andalucía 
R3 Torrente de Cinca Aragon R10 Antequera Andalucía 
R4 Vinaròs Valencia R11 Guadix Andalucía 
R5 Murcia Murcia R12 Vera Andalucía 
R6 Granada Andalucía R13 Puerto Lumbreras Murcia 
R7 Seville Andalucía    
 
 
Table A.3. The candidate pipelines 
Pipeline Origin Destination Distance (km) 
Average 
terrain 
cost  
factor 
τ
 
Pipeline Origin Destination Distance (km) 
Average 
terrain 
cost  
factor 
τ
 
P1 E1 E2 286.0 1.34 P26 S3 R3  79.4   1.18  
P2 E2 E16 194.0 1.32 P27 S3 R4  127.0   1.19  
P3 E16 E5 99.7 1.12 P28 E10 S4  199.0   1.17  
P4 E16 S8 75.0 1.44 P29 E15 S5  270.0   1.08  
P5 S8 R8 84.0 1.21 P30 S5 E10  115.0   1.08  
P6 E5 R1 82.2 1.20 P31 S5 R5  146.0   1.05  
P7 R1 E4 86.0 1.09 P32 E11 R5  49.5   1.01  
P8 E4 R8 67.0 1.03 P33 R5 S6  84.0   1.03  
P9 R8 E3 120.0 1.02 P34 R6 S7  140.0   1.35  
P10 E2 E3 125.0 1.35 P35 E14 R7  83.0   1.04  
P11 E4 S1 84.6 1.03 P36 E13 R7  183.0   1.05  
P12 S1 E15 221.0 1.04 P37 R7 R9  141.0   1.06  
P13 E15 S4 127.0 1.07 P38 R9 S7  147.0   1.11  
P14 E15 S7 251.0 1.09 P39 R6 R10  102.0   1.26  
P15 R1 S2 65.8 1.15 P40 R10 E13  183.0   1.11  
P16 E6 S2 85.1 1.09 P41 R7 R10  160.0   1.07  
P17 E6 R2 86.4 1.10 P42 R9 R10  115.0   1.13  
P18 S2 R2 71.7 1.02 P43 R11 R6  54.0   1.35  
P19 R2 E9 104.0 1.02 P44 E12 R11  112.0   1.24  
P20 E7 E8 99.0 1.20 P45 E12 R12  87.0   1.09  
P21 E8 R3  122.0   1.18  P46 R12 E11  113.0   1.06  
P22 R3 E9  121.0   1.16  P47 R5 R13  89.0   1.04  
P23 E8 R4  115.0   1.08  P48 R13 R12  47.0   1.15  
P24 R4 E10  151.0   1.50  P49 R13 R11  143.0   1.18  
P25 E9 S3  105.0   1.03  P26 S3 R3  79.4   1.18  
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Figure 1. The geography of the emission clusters and the candidate pipelines and storage sites 
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Figure 2. The capture potentials ijQ  at each cluster under each scenario (in MtCO2/year) 
(a) Scenario “All” 
 
(b) Scenario “Indus_only” 
 
Source: Simulation results of the TIMES-COMET model under the central scenario. 
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Figure 3. CO2 pipeline and storage deployment in Spain  
(a) Scenario “All” 
 
Total volume of CO2 captured and stored: 112.7 MtCO2/year 
Total length of the pipeline system: 2,800 km 
Total annual equivalent cost:  €1,160.8 million 
     Total annual equivalent pipeline cost:      €694.7 million (59.8% of the total) 
     Total annual equivalent storage cost:      €466.1 million (40.2% of the total) 
 
(b) Scenario “Indus_only”  
 
Total volume of CO2 captured and stored: 55.2 MtCO2/year 
Total length of the pipeline system: 2,378 km 
Total annual equivalent cost:  €586.6 million 
     Total annual equivalent pipeline cost:      €418.3 million (71.3% of the total) 
     Total annual equivalent storage cost:      €168.3 million (28.7% of the total) 
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Figure 4. An illustration of the three independent subsystems  
(a) Scenario “All” 
 
(b) Scenario “Indus_only”  
 
 
